In Which A Moron Dismisses A Thousand Years of History

Burnination wrote:

I think that the best form of government (if I am compelled to accept one) would be something more like a multi-party parliamentary system with a permanent or semi-permanent head of state. (To combine the best of both worlds, essentially.)

Yeah, I think so, too. It'd be the easiest to get people to accept, if nothing else. A world of Liechtensteins, more or less.

@Sacae: The high illiteracy rate of medieval Europe (and really, the pre-Industrial age) was less because monarchies stifle literacy and more because the cost of materials before the Industrial age prevented books and paper from being affordable for all classes. Democracy is not necessarily freedom is all I have to say on that. Barack Obama probably has more power over his citizens than Maria Teresa had over her subjects.

Anyway, to sum up my argument, I'm going to quote from the beginning of Hans-Herman Hoppe's The Political Economy of Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of a Natural Order. It's a good read, though Hoppe is an anarchist and not a monarchist.

Hoppe wrote:

The defining characteristic of private government ownership is that the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation are individually owned. The appropriated resources are added to the ruler’s private estate and treated as if they were a part of it, and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation is attached as a title to this estate and leads to an instant increase in its present value (‘capitalization’ of monopoly profit). Most importantly, as private owner of the government estate, the ruler is entitled to pass his possessions onto his personal heir; he may sell, rent, or give away part or all of his privileged estate and privately pocket the receipts from the sale or rental; and he may personally employ or dismiss every administrator and employee of his estate.
In contrast, with a publicly owned government the control over the government apparatus lies in the hands of a trustee, or caretaker. The caretaker may use the apparatus to his personal advantage, but he does not own it. He cannot sell government resources and privately pocket the receipts, nor can he pass government possessions onto his personal heir. He owns the current use of government resources, but not their capital value. Moreover, while entrance into the position of a private owner of government is restricted by the owner’s personal discretion, entrance into the position of a caretaker-ruler is open. Anyone, in principle, can become the government’s caretaker.
From these assumptions two central, interrelated predictions can be deduced: (1) A private government owner will tend to have a systematically longer planning horizon, i.e., his degree of time preference will be lower, and accordingly, his degree of economic exploitation will tend to be less than that of a government caretaker; and (2), subject to a higher degree of exploitation, the non­-governmental public will also be comparatively more present-oriented under a system of publicly-owned government than under a regime of private government ownership.